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LEGISLATING AROUND THE SUPREME COURT'S
HOLDING THAT PRESCRIBER-IDENTIFYING DATA IS
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Jeff Gibellina*
INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is big business - really, really big
business. Johnson & Johnson, a leader in the pharmaceutical
manufacturing industry, generated $61.9 billion in revenue in 2009,
resulting in $12.2 billion in profits.' Pfizer, a similarly situated company,
generated $50 billion in revenue in 2009, resulting in $8.6 billion in
profits.2 Due to the Supreme Court's ruling in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,'
those profits are unlikely to dip any time soon.4 On First Amendment
grounds, the Sorrell court struck down a state statute and consequently
allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue using a particularly
influential form of marketing called "detailing," which entails the use of
prescriber-identifying data typically obtained from pharmacies to better
target physicians.' After this ruling, a question remained: what could those
states that restricted the use of prescriber-identifying data have done
differently to lawfully curb the harmful marketing tactic? Regardless of
the answer to this question, the Sorrell court erred in finding that the
Vermont statute failed to sufficiently protect the state's privacy interest
J.D. Candidate, 2013 DePaul College of Law. He serves as the incoming executive text editor on
DePaul's Journal of Health Care Law. He grew up in the Chicago land area and received his bachelor's
degree at Marquette University. He and his wife, Emily, reside in Forest Park, IL.
1. Global 500, CNN MONEY, at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/snapshots/235.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2012, 6:16 p.m.) (To get to Johnson & Johnson, click on "101-200" in the drop-down
box and scroll down to #108).
2. Global 500, CNN MONEY, at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/snapshots/324.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2012,
6:16 p.m.). (To get to Pfizer, click on "101-200" in the drop-down box and scroll down to #140).
3. See generally, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
4. Kate Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Pfizer Races to Reinvent Itself, May 01, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/05/02/business/pfizer-profit-declines-19-after-loss-of-lipitor-patent.html
(Perhaps Pfizer's profits will dip due to the expiration of its patent on Lipitor, which is completely
unrelated to the Supreme Court's ruling in Sorrell.).
5. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
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and should have upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
THE POWER OF "DETAILING"
One of the underlying forces behind such massive profit margins for
pharmaceutical manufacturers is marketing. It is well documented that
pharmaceutical companies spend billions of dollars on marketing annually,
which includes millions of visits to physicians' offices by pharmaceutical
sales representatives.6 Even in 2000, brand-name drug manufacturers spent
$4 billion on these face-to-face interactions, also known as "detailing."'
The Maine legislature defined "detailing" as "one-to-one contact with a
prescriber or employees or agents of a prescriber for the purpose of
increasing or reinforcing the prescribing of a certain drug by the
prescriber."' Detailing is thought to be particularly effective in persuading
physicians to prescribe "high-profit brand-name drugs protected by
patent."9 Because the process of detailing is time-consuming and
expensive, drug manufacturers use it to market only those drugs that
generate significant profits.o Those profitable drugs are as prevalent as
ever, as 90,000 pharmaceutical sales representatives, also known as
"detailers," make weekly or monthly trips to physicians' offices on an
annual basis." To further emphasize the prevalence of detailing, the
average primary-care physician meets with twenty-eight or more detailers
every week while specialists meet with fourteen per week.12 Detailers who
visit these physicians usually bring drug samples and medical studies that
tout the advantages of their employer's pharmaceutical drugs." In addition
to promotional materials and pamphlets highlighting the effectiveness of
their pharmaceutical products, detailers distribute nearly $1 billion worth
6, David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients' Interests, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 74 (2010) (citing Julie M. Donohue, et al, A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. no.7, 673, 676 (2007) (reporting annual expenditures on
detailing of about $7 billion between 2002 and 2005); David L. Coleman, et al, Guidelines for Interactions
between Clinical Faculty and the Pharmaceutical Industry: One Medical School's Approach, 81 ACAD.
MED. no. 2, 154 (2006) (reporting that pharmaceutical companies employ more than 80,000 sales
representatives and that the average physician meets with a sales representative four times per month); John
Russell, Lilly Changes Course as it Shrinks its Sales Force, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 17, 2010, at Al8
(reporting that drug companies appear to be reducing their sales forces.).
7. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2008).
8. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E(l)(A-2) (West Supp. 2010).
9. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660 ("Once a brand-name drug's patent expires, less expensive bioequivalent
generic alternatives are manufactured and sold.").
10. Ayotte, 550 F. 3d at 46.
11. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2010).
12. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47.
13. Mills, 616 F.3d at 14.
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of free samples annually.14
Detailers gain access to offices by offering physicians and staff
objective information regarding the "latest pharmacological
developments," thereby saving the physicians' time that would otherwise
be used to educate themselves on such developments." Furthermore,
detailers gain entry by bringing small gifts to physicians and staff, by
hosting complimentary lunches, and by handing out the aforementioned
complimentary drug samples." During these meetings, a physician can
ask questions following a presentation and the detailer typically will
establish a follow-up schedule with the physician." As the Mills court
correctly noted, "The central objective is to get prescribers to adopt the
pharmaceutical product the detailer is marketing and to build brand
loyalty."'"
Detailing is used in a few scenarios, including when pharmaceutical
manufacturers want physicians to understand why their brand-name drug
is better than the generic drug or better than a competitor's patented drug.'
Additionally, detailing maintains brand loyalty in anticipation of the patent
expiration on a manufacturer's brand-name drug and the physician has the
opportunity to prescribe a generic version of the drug.20
PRESCRIBER-IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
The practice of detailing becomes far more profitable for
pharmaceutical manufacturers with the availability of "prescriber-
identifying information." Such information is gathered by pharmacies
(usually for insurance reimbursement purposes2 ') each time they receive a
prescription from a physician.22 Prescriber-identifying information is
stored on pharmacies' computerized databases and includes a "potpourri of
information,"23 including the identity of the prescribing physician, the
drug, the dosage, and the quantity dispensed.24 Pharmacies are able to
generate vast amounts of data on individual physician's prescribing habits
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sorrell, 131 U.S. at 2659.
18. Mills, 616 F.3d at 8.
19. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 46.
20. Id.
21. 616 F.3d at 15.
22. Id. at 12.
23. 550 F.3d at 45.
24. Id.
3432012]
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over time,25 which eventually serve as an invaluable resource for detailers
in crafting their marketing message toward a targeted audience. 26 The
information ultimately allows detailers to identify and subsequently target
those physicians that consistently use a competitor's drugs, physicians that
prescribe large quantities of drugs for a particular condition, and
physicians that have a propensity to use new drugs that have recently made
their way to the market ("early adopters").27
Creating Prescriber-Identifying Information
The detailers' use of prescriber-identifying information is actually the
last step in a series of transactions that begins with gathering huge
amounts of prescriber-identifying data." In order for detailers to obtain
this information in such a way as to be useful to them, pharmaceutical
manufacturers must purchase it from "data miners."2 Data miners contract
with pharmacies, insurance companies and other carriers to purchase their
raw data.30 The contracts compel the pharmacies to send to the data miners
the prescription data collected by the pharmacies' computer software.3 1 To
get an idea of the sheer volume of information exchanging hands, two of
the more prominent data miners, IMS Health Inc. and Verispan LLC,
organize information from several billion prescriptions annually.3 2 While
the prescriber-identifying data does not include the patient's name, data
miners assign a unique number to the patient." With that ID number, data
miners can determine how long a patient is on a drug, whether the
physician prescribed a new drug and the name of that new drug, and if the
physician discontinued drug therapy altogether on that particular patient.34
With the vast amount of data, data mining companies are able to create
reports and databases that are more often than not tailored to sell or lease
to pharmaceutical manufactures.35 With the drug manufacturers in mind,
the data miners illustrate a prescribing-physician's history by "cross
25. 616 F.3d at 12.
26. Id. at 14.
27. 550 F.3d at 48.
28. 616 F.3d at 15.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 45 (To ensure patient privacy, patients' names are encrypted so it's impossible to
match particular prescriptions with particular patients.) (emphasis added.).
33. David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection ofPatients' Interests, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 74, 75 (2010).
34. Id.
35. Mills, 616 F.3d at 16.
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referencing prescriber names with publicly available databases, including
the [American Medical Association's] database of medical doctors'
specialties.""6 Data miners then sell or lease the prescriber-identifying data,
subject to nondisclosure agreements," to pharmaceutical manufacturers
who in turn give it to their sales representatives (detailers) who use it to
determine which physicians to target in their marketing efforts." Similar to
the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, business is good for data
miners. IMS Health earned $1.75 billion in revenue in 2005." That figure
alone is a strong indicator of the value such information has for detailers
and the impact it has on bottom lines for companies like Pfizer and
Johnson & Johnson.
Harmful Effects of Prescriber-Identifying Information
Due to a number of perceived adverse consequences, the use of
prescriber-identifying information by detailers to influence physicians to
buy or prescribe a pharmaceutical manufacturer's drugs has come under
fire in several states. This has occurred most notably in Maine, New
Hampshire, and Vermont. The New Hampshire legislature determined
that prescriber-identifying information gave detailers too much bargaining
power or leverage, which in turn had an inflationary impact on drug prices
due to detailers' success in pushing more expensive brand-name drugs in
lieu of cheaper generic drugs.40 The impact of such inflation results in
increased healthcare costs, which hinders state Medicaid programs' ability
to fund the needs of their beneficiaries.41 Additionally, this bargaining
power held by detailers can lead to physicians' having an "overly
enthusiastic view" on a particular brand-name drug, resulting in fewer
prescriptions of cheaper, equally effective drugs.42 On a similar note, with
prescriber-identifying information, detailers tend to become more
"adversarial" in their presentation and focus on the negative effects of
drugs that physicians are currently using in hopes that they will switch to
the brand-name drug.43 Using this adversarial approach, detailers tend to
36. Id.
37. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 at 2660.
38. See Orentlicher, supra note 30, at 74.
39. Mills, 616 F.3d at 16.
40. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 54.
41. See Orentlicher, supra note 30, at 81.
42. Id. at 76 (citing Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a
Gift? 283 JAMA 373, 378 (2000) ("After interactions with sales representatives, for example, physicians
are more likely to prescribe expensive, new drugs instead of cheaper generic drugs, even when there is no
medical advantage to the newer drug.").
43. 550 F.3d at 56.
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ignore the virtues of their own drugs, focusing on the vices of competitors'
drugs, and therefore fail to adequately distinguish them from other
sometimes cheaper, generic drugs." Moreover, the New Hampshire
legislature found that detailers' access to such information compromised
the decision-making of physicians who received most of their information
from brand-name-drug detailers.4 5 One study showed that physicians were
more likely to prescribe a drug that was heavily promoted over another
equally effective drug that was not promoted.4 6 Most physicians are
unaware of this propensity to lean toward the promoted drug even though
most claim that they strictly look at medical data.47
Another concern is reciprocation with respect to the gifts that
detailers give to physicians during their one-on-one visits.48 Prescribing
physicians feel the need to reciprocate upon receiving a gift, and do so by
promoting the detailer's drug.49 In fact, one study indicates that physicians'
prescribing practices are most influenced by the compulsion to
reciprocate."o
In addition, physicians feel that detailers' access to their prescribing
history is a violation of their privacy." Many physicians believe that
prescriber-identifying information increases the number of "unwanted
marketing calls."5 2 Detailers also use such historical information to
confront physicians when they deviate from prescribing their brand-name
drugs." Physicians have been "outraged that people came into their office
and talked to them about how many times they prescribed a particular
drug."5 4  Despite the widespread adversity to detailers' access to
44. Id.
45. Id. at 54.
46. 38 J.L. MED & ETHICS at 76 (citing J. Avorn, M. Chen, and R. Hartley, Scientific versus Commercial
Sources of Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4 (1982). To be sure, not
all studies find that drug detailing distorts physician prescribing decisions. J. M. Donohue, et al., Effects of
Pharmaceutical Promotion on Adherence to the Treatment Guidelines for Depression, 42 MED. CARE 42
1176, 1182 (2004) (finding "no evidence ... that detailing affected rates of adherence to guideline treatment
of depression.")
47. Id.
48. See generally 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS.
49. Id. at 76 (citing Manchanda & Honka, supra note 17, at 799-800; Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, supra note 2, at 447-449; M. M. Chren, et al., Doctors, Drug Companies, and Gifis, 262 JAMA
3448 (1989); J. Dana & G. Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry,
290 JAMA 252 (2003)).
50. Id.
51. Mills, 616 F.3d at 15.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object as Drug Makers Learn Who's Prescribing What, N.Y.
TtMES, May 4,2006, at Al).
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prescriber-identifying information, there are arguments to be made
regarding its societal benefits."
Benefits of Prescriber-Identifying Information
Detailers offer physicians information in a timely manner that they
can immediately use to help their patients. There is a belief in the medical
field, that the more information, the better, regardless of its source." The
information that detailers offer physicians would often be expensive or
take valuable time for physicians to obtain on their own." Such
information includes "studies relevant to [a physician's] practice, useful
free samples, and targeted data about how widely certain drugs used to
treat the same conditions and information about new drugs or more
effective alternatives to the prescriptions they currently prescribe.""
Moreover, physicians have found the comparisons that detailers make
between drugs during their presentations to be immensely helpful." With
respect to time, physicians appreciate that detailers are well-versed in their
prescribing history and can therefore create efficient sales pitches that do
not entail a lot of information-gathering during the detailers' visits.60
Although there is arguably an upside to detailers possessing and using
prescriber-identifying information, a group of New England states took
action to curb the practice.
REGULATING PRESCRIBER-IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont all passed legislation that
virtually forbade pharmacies, insurance companies, or any other entity that
possesses prescriber-identifying information from leasing, transferring, or
selling that information to data miners." Rather than directly restricting
detailers from using prescriber-identifying information, the statutes
targeted data miners by seeking to prevent them from transmitting such
information to the pharmaceutical manufacturers.62 By attempting to
control the actions of data miners rather than legislating what detailers can
55. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
56. Id.
57. 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS at 77.
58. Mills, 616 F.3d at 15.
59. Id.
60. Sorell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
61. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Trr. 22 § 1711-E (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006); VT.
STAT. ANN. TIT. 18, § 4631(d) (2009).
62. Id.
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and cannot say to physicians, the states were likely trying to avoid First
Amendment challenges to the new laws. It was clear, however, that the
legislatures wanted to prevent detailers from using prescriber-identifying
information based on the stated legislative purposes of the laws. In Maine,
the statute included a section that stated, "Restricting the use of prescriber-
identifying information will act to decrease drug detailing that targets the
prescriber, thus increasing decisions to prescribe lower priced drugs and
decisions made on the basis of medical and scientific knowledge and
driving down the cost of health care."" Under the Vermont statute, the
legislation inserted a similar section to that found in the Maine statute:
"The goals of marketing programs are often in conflict with the goals of
the state. . .[the] marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and
effectiveness is frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest
in expensive pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors."'
THE COURTS STEP IN
Soon after the aforementioned states passed these laws, the big data
mining companies brought suit against the states challenging the
constitutionality of the laws.65 The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America joined the data mining companies in their
federal suit challenging the Vermont statute, which was eventually heard
by the Supreme Court.66 The data miners claimed that the laws violated
their First Amendment right to speech because of the statute's restrictions
on disseminating information and sought declaratory and injunctive
relief.67 What ensued was an in-depth analysis by the federal district and
circuit courts in an attempt to balance "the public's desire for
informational privacy and the First Amendment's freedom to speak."68
The Courts' Analysis
The first issue addressed by the courts was whether prescriber-
identifying information was speech protected under the First Amendment.
The First Circuit and the Second Circuit agreed that prescriber-identifying
information was speech based on the longstanding precedent that
63. ME REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22, § 1711-E(1 -A)(D) (2007).
64. Sorell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661.
65. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 78-79.
66. Id.
67. Sorrel, 131 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing Vt. Acts No. 80 § 1).
68. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 79.
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"information" is protected under the First Amendment.69 However, they
split on whether the sale or lease of prescriber-identifying information by
data miners was conduct or speech." If, as the Second Circuit found, the
data miner's lease or sale of prescriber-identifying information was found
to be commercial speech," then courts would apply intermediate
scrutiny.7 2 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard as it relates to
commercial speech, the government may regulate such speech if (1) "the
communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity;" (2)
the government assert[s] a substantial interest to be achieved" by the
regulation; (3) the restriction "must directly advance the state interest;"
and (4) "if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more
limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive."7 3 If, as the First Circuit found, the sale or lease of information by
data miners is found to be merely business conduct7 4 as opposed to
commercial speech then courts apply a rational basis review because such
conduct falls under "economic regulation" rather than speech regulation."
Due to the split and ultimately the divergent rulings in the First and
Second circuit courts," the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the
case challenging the Vermont statute in the Second Circuit.7
69. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 51 ("We recognize, of course, that pure informational data can qualify for First
Amendment protection."); IMS Health Ic. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The First
Amendment protects '[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic
expression."' (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir.2001))).
70. 550 F.3d at 53 ("This is a situation in which information itself has become a commodity. The plaintiffs,
who are in the business of harvesting, refining, and selling this commodity, ask us in essence to rule that
because their product is information instead of, say, beef jerky, any regulation constitutes a restriction of
speech. We think such an interpretation stretches the fabric of the First Amendment beyond any rational
measure."); Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 272 (The legislative findings that prompted the Vermont statute clearly
indicate that the statute's purpose to influence the supply of information, "a core first amendment
concern.").
71. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) ("Speech which does
'no more than propose a commercial transaction.").
72. 131 U.S. at 275 (Intermediate scrutiny applies to commercial speech as opposed to strict scrutiny
which applies to fully protected speech.).
73. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
74. There is no clear definition for what amounts to "business conduct." The term itself is understood as a
label for activity that cannot meet the threshold of commercial speech and therefore the regulation of that
activity does not receive intermediate scrutiny, but rather rational basis review as an "economic regulation."
75. 550 F.3d at 54 (This court still went ahead and applied the Central Hudson test, for argument's sake,
and still found the New Hampshire statute to be constitutional).
76. Id. at 64 (The First Circuit court reversed the district court and lifted the injunction against enforcement
of the New Hampshire statute); Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 282 (The Vermont statute could not survive
intermediate scrutiny and was found to be an unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech under the
Central Hudson test.).
77. See generally Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2656.
3492012]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 14.2:341
The Supreme Court Ruling in Sorrell
The Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., ultimately held
that the Vermont statute restricting the use of prescriber-identifying
information by data miners was unconstitutional." The Court reached its
holding by first determining that the prescriber-identifying information at
issue in the statute was in fact speech." Moreover, the statute includes
both content- and speaker-based restrictionso on use of prescriber
identifying information. The exceptions found in the statute for when the
use of prescriber-identifying information is permissible" illustrate the
content-based restriction, seeing as data miners are prohibited from using
it to sell or lease to pharmaceutical manufacturers when other entities can
disseminate it for purposes that the state sees best fit.82 Furthermore, the
second part of the statute prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from
using the data for marketing purposes," thus disfavoring a particular
content of speech in marketing.84 In terms of speaker-related restrictions,
the Vermont statute disfavors pharmaceutical manufacturers, more
specifically, detailers, from using the information in their pitches to
physicians." The Court dispels of any notions that the statute only
incidentally restricts the speech of detailers and pharmaceutical
manufacturers by citing the legislative record.86 That record stated in part
that detailers who promote brand-name drugs often convey messages that
"4are often in conflict with the goals of the state."" As the Court noted in
another case, a statute's stated purpose may be considered in determining
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2667 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995) ("If the acts of 'disclosing'
and 'publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that
category, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct."'); Id. (the Court makes no distinction
between commercial speech or pure speech stating that the outcome would be the same either way.)
80. Id. at 2663. (A provision in the Vermont statute forbids pharmaceutical manufacturers from using
prescriber identifying information for marketing, which qualifies as speech with a particular content.
Moreover, the statute prevents detailers from obtaining such information even though several other
speakers can use the same information.)
81. Id. at 2660 (citing VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4631(e)(4) (2009)) ("Prescriber-identifying information
may be disseminated or used for 'health-care research'; to enforce 'compliance' with health insurance
formularies, or preferred drug lists; for care management educational communications provided to patients
on such matters as 'treatment options'; for law enforcement operations; and for purposes 'otherwise
provided by law."').
82. Id. at 2663. (For example, the statute allows speakers to purchase and use prescriber-identifying
information for "educational communications" and academic research.)
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing 2007 Vt. No. 80, § 1(3))
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whether regulations unduly burden First Amendment rights."
Having determined that prescriber-identifying information was
speech, and that restrictions in the statute on such speech particularly
target data miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Supreme Court
applied heightened scrutiny to the Vermont statute." The Court applied the
Central Hudson test in part to determine the constitutionality of the statute
by asking whether the State met its burden in showing that the "statute
directly advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure
is drawn to achieve that interest."o
Vermont's interests, similar to the interests in New Hampshire and
Maine, were protection of medical privacy, which entailed physician
confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-
patient relationship.9 1 Secondly, the state asserted policy objectives in
improving public health and reduced healthcare costs.92 The Supreme
Court summarily dismissed the interest in protecting physician privacy by
pointing out that the statute allows prescriber-identifying information to be
used and studied by almost a "limitless audience" with the exception of
data miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers.9 3 If the State was truly
interested in protecting physician privacy, it would have employed more
far-reaching restrictions on access to prescriber-identifying information.
As far as the avoidance of harassment interest of the state, the Court
refused to accept that the statute at issue was necessary to accommodate a
small group of physicians that may have felt harassed by detailers." The
Court was also leery of the State's interest in protecting the integrity of the
doctor-patient relationship by preventing detailers from unduly influencing
the doctor's treatment decisions.9 6 The Court found that the statute could
not protect such an interest because the detailer's speech was not
misleading, but merely persuasive.9 7 "Absent circumstances far from those
[presented in the Court], the fear that speech might persuade provides no
88. Id. (citing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-88 (1968)).
89. Id. at 2664 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The First Amendment
requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.")
90. Id. at 2667-68 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
91. Id. at 2668.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2669.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2669 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)) (Putting up with speech
you do not like is the necessary cost of freedom.).
96. Id. at 2670.
97. Id.
3512012]
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lawful basis for quieting it."9 8 Regarding the public policy arguments made
by the State, the Court returns to the legal conclusion that under almost
any circumstance, a state cannot restrict persuasive speech via a statute in
order to advance a legitimate interest." The Court offered several
alternatives for the State to curb the practice of detailing."o At the end of
the day, the Court found the statute unconstitutional because it "burdened
a form of expression that it found too persuasive," while allowing other
speakers to convey messages using prescriber-identifying information that
were "in accord with [the State's] view."'' Given the Supreme Court's
ruling in Sorrell, the scope of the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech
right has expanded in scope to the detriment of society. The holding begs
the question: where did the state legislatures go wrong?
WHAT STATE LEGISLATURES LEARNED FROM SORRELL
The First Circuit made a compelling argument that the data mining
statutes in New Hampshire and Maine were in fact regulating conduct
rather than speech.'02 After all, the statutes regulated the sale or lease of
prescriber-identifying data by data miners. As such, the data mining laws
were merely regulating an economic transaction (a sale) between data
miners and their customers-not an expression protected under the First
Amendment.'03 Moreover, the statutes were not prohibiting detailers from
meeting with physicians or placing limits on what detailers could say to
the physicians, only prohibiting them from using one of many marketing
tools.'" However, like the Supreme Court found in Sorrell, it was obvious
that the statute indirectly targeted detailers and the content of their
98. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
99. Id. at 2671. (The state may not seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace
by prohibiting truthful, misleading advertisements that contain impressive endorsements or catchy jingles.
That if the state finds expression too persuasive, that does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its
messengers.); Id. (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 769-70 (1976)) (The decision "between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available" is made for us by the First Amendment.).
100. Id. at 2668-2672. (The State could assert its privacy interest by allowing the information's sale or
disclosure in only a "few narrow and well-justified circumstances." The State could encourage doctors to
refuse to meet with detailers, which is well within doctors' rights. Additionally, the State could use counter-
speech to inform the public of the harmful effects that prescriber-identifying information can have on
patients and the State as a whole.)
101. Id. at 2672.
102. See generally Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 42; Mills, 616 F.3d at 7.
103. David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash Between the
Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective Protection From Harm, 37
AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 310 (2011).
104. Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 80.
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presentations to physicians.'o The dissent in Ayotte questioned why the
New Hampshire state legislature was able to regulate the speech of
detailers indirectly by placing heavy regulations upon data miners rather
than directly placing restrictions on detailers' speech, which would clearly
amount to a First Amendment violation."o' The legislative findings
associated with the statutes left little doubt that the driving force behind
the laws was to curb the widespread practice of detailing.107 The Supreme
Court noted that the Vermont legislature found that the "goals of
marketing programs are often in conflict with the goals of the state. . .[the]
marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is frequently
one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in expensive
pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors."' 8 With such language
available to the Court, it was clear that the states wanted to regulate
detailing while avoiding constitutional challenges related to First
Amendment rights.'09 The Court was well within its right to consider the
statute's state purpose"0 and in doing so struck down the Vermont statute
as a thinly veiled infringement on the detailers' fundamental right to free
speech."' If the states could have avoided such explicit references to
detailing when drafting their statutes, then the underlying purpose of the
statute would likely not have been so abundantly clear and as a result may
have passed constitutional muster.
Another hurdle that Vermont and the other states could not overcome
was the scant evidence to support the assertion that their statutes directly
advanced a substantial governmental interest as required by the Central
Hudson test. As previously stated, Vermont contended, as did New
Hampshire and Maine, that its statute was necessary to protect medical
privacy, specifically physician confidentiality, avoidance of harassment,
and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship." 2 Furthermore,
Vermont claimed that the data-mining statute furthered policy objectives
105. See generally, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
106. Ayotle, 550 F.3d at 79-84 (Lipez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One of the First
Circuit judges in fact dissented from the court's opinion because he viewed the regulation of data mining as
effectively a regulation of drug detailing. Accordingly, he concluded that the provision involved the
regulation of commercial speech.
107. Mills, 616 F.3d at 17 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 171 1-E(1-A)(D)) (2011).
108. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing 2008 Vt. Acts No. 80 §§ 1(3), (4)).
109. Id. at 2663 ("Formal legislative findings accompanying [Vermont's data mining statute] confirm that
the law's express purpose and practical effect are to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by
manufactures of brand-name drugs.").
110. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)).
111. Id. at 2672.
112. Id. at 2668.
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such as improved public health and reduced healthcare costs."' The
Sorrell court rejected each connection the state attempted to establish
between the statute and governmental interests.114 The Court reasoned that
the connections between the statute and the harassment, privacy, and
doctor-patient interests were too tenuous and were only invoked to get
around impermissible First Amendment regulations pertaining to
pharmaceutical marketing."' Given the Supreme Court's ruling and
reasoning on data-mining statutes, do states have any recourse in
legislating around the Court's decision in order to regulate detailing?
WHERE DO STATE LEGISLATURES GO FROM HERE?
In passing legislation similar to the Vermont statute, but that can
withstand a First Amendment challenge, states may simply have to wait.
Under the Central Hudson test, states need to show that a statute that
regulates commercial speech directly advances a substantial governmental
interest."' However, the concern regarding the ill-effects of detailing is a
fairly recent phenomenon and as such, there are few studies or reports out
there to establish that detailing threatens governmental interests by
inflating healthcare costs or by having a detrimental impact on public
health. As time passes, there will likely be more evidence to establish a
stronger cause-and-effect relationship between data-mining or detailing
statutes and governmental interests that are threatened by detailing.
A more palatable alternative for states that want to minimize the
adverse effects of detailing may be to focus on the physician's privacy
interest. The Supreme Court accepted Vermont's assertion that physician
privacy was a substantial interest." '7 However, because of the way the
Vermont data mining statute was structured, it allowed "information to be
studied and used by all, but a narrow class of disfavored speakers.""' The
113. Id.
114. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668-2672.
115. Id. at 2668-2670. (With respect to the harassment interest, the Court found it "doubtful that concern
for 'a few' physicians who may have 'felt coerced and harassed' by pharmaceutical marketers can sustain a
broad content-based rule like [found in the Vermont statute]." The privacy interest was rejected because
under the Vermont law, "pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying information with anyone for any
reason save one: They must not allow the information to be used for marketing." Regarding the State's
concern that the doctor-patient trust is undermined by the influential nature of prescriber-identifying
information used by detailers, the Court stated "if pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment decisions, it
does so because doctors find it persuasive. Absent circumstances far from those presented here, the fear that
speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it." (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969)).
116. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
117. Id. at 2668.
118. Id. ("Given the information's widespread availability and many permissible uses, the state's asserted
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Supreme Court went as far as to suggest "The state might have advanced
its asserted privacy interest by allowing the information's sale or
disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances.""' In
order for states to have a shot at passing future legislation that regulates
detailing, they must create statutes with limited exceptions as to when it is
permissible to use prescriber-identifying data. States need to convey how
serious they are about protecting their physician privacy interest, which
according to the Supreme Court, the Vermont statute failed to do. That
said, following the Sorrell decision, courts will be skeptical of such
legislation and are likely to apply heightened scrutiny. Nonetheless, the
Court seems receptive to such legislation. However, the Court in Sorrell
should have upheld Vermont's privacy interest with slight, if any,
modification of the statute.
THE STATE'S PRIVACY INTEREST IN SORRELL
The Sorrell court stated that the state of Vermont indeed has an
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of prescription decisions made
by physicians.120 However, the Court reasoned that the State's statute was
not narrowly tailored and thus underinclusive because it allowed
pharmacies to "share prescriber-identifying information with anyone for
any reasons save one: They must not allow the information to be used for
marketing." 2' The Court elaborated on its finding by stating that the
"Exceptions [in the Vermont statute] further allow pharmacies to sell
prescriber-identifying information for certain purposes, including 'health
care research."" 22 Furthermore, the Court claimed the statute permitted
"insurers, researchers, journalists, the State itself, and others to use the
information."' 23 The Court grossly overstated the accessibility of
prescriber-identifying information outside of detailers and thus wrongly
decided that the state's privacy interest was not adequately protected under
the statute. At no point, under the "exceptions" section of the statute, does
the statute indicate that prescriber-identifying information is accessible to
"anyone for any reason save one."' 24 In fact, subsection (d) of the statute,
interest in physician confidentiality does not justify the burden that [the statute] places on protected
expression.).
119. Id
120. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668; See, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d).
(e) The prohibitions set forth in subsection (d) of this section shall not apply to the following:
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forbids the sale or marketing of prescriber-identifying information to
anyone unless the sale or marketing meets the criteria set forth in
subsection (e) or if a prescriber consents to such a sale.125
The Exceptions
Contrary to what the Supreme Court said in Sorrell, the exceptions to
the prohibition of the sale of prescriber-identifying information by
pharmacies are narrowly tailored. The exceptions strictly relate to the
administrative side of prescription information, to promoting the
knowledge and well-being of healthcare patients, and to federal law
enforcement regulations. Few would argue against the need for disclosure
of prescriber-identifying data under these circumstances and the inherent
privacy associated with each exception.
Administrative Exceptions
The exceptions for administrative functions under the Vermont
statute apply to (1) pharmacy reimbursement, (2) prescription drug
formulary compliance, (3) patient-care management, (4) utilization review
by a health care professional, the patient's health insurer, or the agent of
either, (5) the dispensing of prescription medications to a patient or to the
patient's authorized representative, and (6) the transmission of prescription
(1) the sale, license, exchange for value, or use, of regulated records for the limited purposes of pharmacy
reimbursement; prescription drug formulary compliance; patient care management; utilization review by a
health care professional, the patient's health insurer, or the agent of either; or health care research;
(2) the dispensing of prescription medications to a patient or to the patient's authorized representative;
(3) the transmission of prescription information between an authorized prescriber and a licensed pharmacy,
between licensed pharmacies, or that may occur in the event a pharmacy's ownership is changed or
transferred;
(4) care management educational communications provided to a patient about the patient's health condition,
adherence to a prescribed course of therapy and other information relating to the drug being dispensed,
treatment options, recall or patient safety notices, or clinical trials;
(5) the collection, use, or disclosure of prescription information or other regulatory activity as authorized by
chapter 84, chapter 84A, or section 9410 of this title, or as otherwise provided by law;
(6) the collection and transmission of prescription information to a Vermont or federal law enforcement
officer engaged in his or her official duties as otherwise provided by law; and
(7) the sale, license, exchange for value, or use of patient and prescriber data for marketing or promoting if
the data do not identify a prescriber, and there is no reasonable basis to believe that the data provided could
be used to identify a prescriber.
125. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d).
(d) A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other
similar entity shall not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records containing prescriber-
identifiable information, nor permit the use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable
information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber consents as provided in
subsection (c) of this section. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use
prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber
consents as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
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information between an authorized prescriber and a licensed pharmacy,
between licensed pharmacies, or that may occur in the event a pharmacy's
ownership is changed or transferred.126  All of the administrative
exceptions carved out in the Vermont statute are necessary for the orderly
operation of pharmacies, insurers and doctor's offices. Furthermore, these
exceptions are critical to the efficient flow of information between the
aforementioned parties.
The Exceptions for the Benefit of Healthcare Patients
In addition to the administrative exceptions, the Vermont statute
contains exceptions that relate to the well being of patients. Pharmacies are
allowed to sell, license, or exchange for value, or use, of regulated records
for (1) healthcare research; (2) care management educational
communications provided to a patient about the patient's (a) health
condition, (b) adherence to a prescribed course of therapy and (c) other
information relating to the drug being dispensed, treatment options, recall
or patient safety notices, or clinical trials; and (3) to assist a specified state
program in compiling healthcare information.'27 For the most part, these
exceptions only result in the disclosure of prescriber-identifying
information to patients and a specific state agency, which is necessary in
order for patients to receive the best treatment.
However, the Court presented a valid point in finding that the
exception of "healthcare research" was too broad to adequately protect the
State's privacy interest.128 This exception is the only phrase in section (e)
that could be interpreted as being too broad for giving a wide spectrum of
people access to prescriber-identifying information. Though the Court's
belief is speculative, because it lacks evidence to support such widespread
accessibility, Vermont and other states could easily get around such a
finding by including qualifiers or strict parameters relating to healthcare
research to ensure that only a small, definable group has access to
prescriber-identifying information under such an exception. An example
of such a parameter would be to make access to such information available
only to certain certified institutions, which would ensure that the
information was not available to an almost "limitless audience" as the
Court stated'29 and that appropriate measures were taken to keep such
126. See generally, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(e).
127. See generally, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(e).
128. Id. ("Exceptions further allow pharmacies to sell prescriber-identifying information for certain
purposes, including 'healthcare research.' And the measure permits insurers, researchers, journalists , the
State itself, and others to use the information.)
129. Id. ("Vermont made prescriber-identifying information available to almost a limitless audience.")
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information private.
The Federal Law Enforcement Exception
The final category of exceptions is the use of prescriber-identifying
information to facilitate enforcement of law. Section 4631(e)(6) of the
Vermont statute states that "the collection and transmission of prescription
information to a Vermont or federal law enforcement officer engaged in
his or her official duties as otherwise provided by law.""o Because of the
narrow exception under this subsection and tits support (or lack of pretext)
for the State's privacy interest, the Court expressed no opinion on this
particular exception.
The categories in the exceptions section in the Vermont statute allow
pharmacies to sell or disclose prescriber-identifying information to
insurers, physicians, other pharmacies, a state agency, federal law
enforcement officials, and patients."' All of these potential recipients
need the information for administrative purposes, to improve the well
being of patients, or to enforce laws. The State clearly made an effort to
narrowly tailor the exceptions so only those that absolutely needed such
information could obtain it. The statute unequivocally denies the
distribution of prescriber-identifying data to the general population in
which a very small fraction of that group are pharmaceutical
manufacturers. This fact alone disproves the Supreme Court's assertions
that "share prescriber-identifying information with anyone for any reasons
save one: They must not allow the information to be used for
marketing." 32 Admittedly, the State's inclusion of "healthcare research"
as an exception may have been too broad, but a narrower description of
what amounts to healthcare research, if needed, should overcome the
Court's skepticism toward whether the State was adequately protecting a
privacy interest.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court once again established that it is almost never
permissible to restrict an entity's First Amendment right to free speech
even if that entity is a juggernaut in the pharmaceutical manufacturing
industry. As a result, companies like Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson will
continue to reap the massive financial benefits of detailing while states
130. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(e).6).
131. See generally, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(e).
132. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
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continue to try to minimize the influence and subsequent harmful effects
of pharmaceutical marketing. States that want to control detailing through
the Central Hudson test under the Commercial Speech doctrine have an
uphill battle. The Supreme Court in Sorrell makes it perfectly clear that an
airtight, direct connection is required between the statute at issue and the
governmental interests. Anything less will leave state legislatures with
unconstitutional statutes. The state of Vermont established such a
connection when it raised its privacy interest, but the Supreme Court
erroneously and unfairly rejected it as underinclusive.

